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Abstract

Bayesian methods are an increasingly popular form of statistical analysis which
uses informative prior distributions to help calculate posterior distributions of models that
represent different hypotheses. Frequentist methods are contrasting methods that are used
more commonly and more well known, but have come under recent criticism. I examined
data gathered by Ellen Robertson, who used information theoretic methods for a
Masters’ Thesis in Ecology and Environmental Science at the University of Maine to
analyze the daily survival probabilities of marsh birds with a Bayesian perspective in
order to get a sense of the Bayesian analysis. Results were as expected; when using
uninformative prior distributions, the Bayesian analysis had almost the same results as
Robertson’s. With the use of Robertson’s calculated parameter estimates as informative
prior distributions, the Bayesian analysis still ended with similar results. The conclusions
in all three versions of statistical analysis were the same. Hence, Bayesian methods can
construct models representing hypotheses effectively.
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CHAPTER ONE:
BIOLOGY OF RAILS

1.1 Introduction
This paper is based on research done by Ellen Robertson for a Masters’ Thesis in
Ecology and Environmental Science at the University of Maine on the virginia rail
(Rallus limicola) and the sora (Porzana carolina), which are both birds in the family
Rallidae, or rails. To fully understand the implications of this paper, it is necessary to
learn about the rails themselves and the biology of the variables and methods involved in
the statistical models analyzed by Robertson and reanalyzed by myself. Many of the
species in this family prefer wetland habitats, and both the virginia rail and the sora can
be found in these sorts of locations throughout most of North America (Alderfer 2006). It
is important to study the habitat and survival probabilities of these birds as they are
facing habitat loss and population decline over recent years (Conway et al. 1994). In the
US, twenty-two states have lost half or more of the wetland habitat they once had
(Fletcher 2003). The potential deterioration of populations of rails also can also have
other lasting effects on the ecosystems (Fletcher 2003). Although these birds are in the
“Least Concern” category of conservation status (“All About Birds” 2011), we need to
understand the impact that this habitat loss may have on their avian populations. By
studying what primarily affects these rails’ daily nest survival probabilities and how
habitat loss will affect these variables we can potentially find ways to prevent these
1

species from becoming higher on the category of conservation status. We must be careful
when studying these probabilities as there is a bias against failed nests that is not properly
accounted for, which leads to an apparent nest success probability that is likely higher
than the true value (Mayfield 1975). To combat this, we calculate daily survival
probabilities and use those to determine an overall nest success probability (Mayfield
1975). The variables studied in Robertson’s thesis were nest age, the water depth change
at the location of the nest and the nest height change between visits to the nest, whether
the marsh where the nest was found had water levels managed through human
intervention (a technique known as impoundment), and the interaction between water
depth change and nest height change. She studied 72 virginia rail and 22 sora nests in
Maine from 2010-2011.

1.2 Background on the Virginia Rail and the Sora
The virginia rail and sora are rails that have many similarities. While they are very
common marsh birds in North America, they have a secretive nature that makes
observation difficult (Kaufmann 1989). They both are found in marshes and wetlands
throughout North America, and nest in hidden locations in very thick vegetation near the
edge of water in the marsh (Alferder 2006). The nests are made from nearby emergent
vegetation, or aquatic plants that also reach above water level into the air (Lowther 1977).
Their nests are constructed so similarly that the primary way to tell the difference is by
identifying the color of the eggs (Kaufmann 1989). The sora is typically around 19 to 25
2

centimeters in length while the virginia rail is around 22 to 27 centimeters (Alferder
2006). The sora and virginia rail on average weigh between 49 to 112 grams and 65 to 95
grams respectively (“All About Birds” 2011). Due to their secretive nature, they are more
often heard than seen (Melvin and Gibbs 2012, Conway 1995). They both feed on seeds,
and insects found in the marshes, although the virginia rail also will eat fish, frogs and
small snakes (“All About Birds” 2011). To breed, they both regularly migrate to a
northern range from the Northwest Territories to California in the west and from New
England to Pennsylvania in the east in the spring (typically around April and May)
(Alferder 2006). They migrate in the early fall (typically around August or September)
for the winter as far south as northern South America (Alferder 2006). Soras tend to more
rigorously and aggressively defend a territory than the virginia rail (Kaufman 1989).
During breeding season, nests are built from nearby vegetation near the water level of the
marsh (Alferder 2006). For both species, both the male and female parents incubate eggs,
feed and protect the young (Kaufmann 1989). Virginia rails and soras very often thrive in
the same marshes throughout their range of distribution (Conway 1995) and even respond
to each other’s calls (Kaufmann 1989). The average clutch size, or the total number of
eggs incubated, is around 10.5 eggs for soras and 8.5 for virginia rails (Kaufmann 1989).
The average incubation period for the virginia rail is around 20 days and for the sora
between 16 and 22 days (Massachusetts Division of Fisheries & Wildlife, 2010).
Due to the many similarities, in habitat, diet, and nesting/breeding, and their few
differences, it makes sense to combine the data gathered on the two birds and study them
3

together as has been done in several studies. We also have to consider sample sizes of
studies; both the virginia rail and the sora can be difficult to find because of their covert
nesting behaviors. Combining data collected on the two birds can help make larger
sample sizes and in turn lead to more precise estimates of the parameters of any statistical
model that is developed.

1.3 Robertson’s Methods and Model Variables
An important method used during the data gathering from Robertson’s research,
as well as any research done on probabilities on nest success, is the Mayfield method.
This is used to counter a bias in data collecting that leads to a perceived higher nest
success probability than is the true probability. When collecting data on nests, the
researcher is randomly collecting data which includes nests of all ages. What would be
ideal is when attempting to estimate a population mean, in this case, the probability of
nest success for the entire population, we could observe all of the nests from start to
finish (success or failure) and take a simple ratio to determine the sample proportion of
nest success (Mayfield 1975). Most often this is impossible, and the data gathered by
Robertson was not collected in this manner. Instead, we use the Mayfield method, which
is calculating daily survival probabilities and using those to estimate the overall rate of
nest success for the population to compensate for a bias towards successful nests
(Mayfield 1975). For example, if we observe 10 nests in a marsh, 9 of which we consider
successful, we have an apparent nest success rate of 90%. However, if there were 8 nests
4

that failed and went unobserved, the true nest success rate would have been 50%, which
is significantly different than the apparent nest success rate. Using the Mayfield method,
we look at the sum of days we observed each nest — that is, if we observed one nest for 3
days, one nest for 4 days and one nest for 5 days, we would have 12 observation days. Of
the 10 nests observed in this example, let’s say we had around 30 total observation days.
Since we had only one nest fail in these 30 observation days, we see that there is a 1/30,
roughly .033, probability of any individual nest failing daily. To calculate the daily
success probability, we subtract the daily failure probability from one, which comes out
to roughly .967. Now that we have our daily survival probability for this example, since
we know that the virginia rail and the sora both have incubation periods of around 20
days, we can raise that probability to the 20th power to estimate the probability of overall
nest success. So for this example, .96720 is approximately 0.51, which is a much better
estimate of the true value of the population described above.
It is also crucial to understand why we research the particular parameters we do,
otherwise studies may make statistical sense but not make any sense biologically.
Likewise, once we determine what is significant and what is not, we must understand
what the significance means.
Of the models researched by Robertson, one of the variables was the age of the
nest. We then ask, what affect, if any, does the age of a nest have on it’s daily survival
probability? There could be two possible answers to this question. We may see that the
older a nest is, the longer it is exposed and the less likely it will be to survive each day.
5

On the contrary, it would be possible that a nest has a higher probability of daily survival
the older it gets because it was hidden and constructed very well. These may not be the
only positive or negative relationships between age of a nest and its daily survival
probability, but we need to consider these before performing any kind of statistical
analysis.
Another variable in the models is whether the area the nest was found in was in an
impoundment or not. An area that is in an impoundment has a structure, either a dam or a
pit, built to control water levels in an area for reasons such as maintaining wetland
environments and providing water for livestock. A positive or negative relationship with
daily nest survival probabilities would likely mean that human intervention of water
levels has an impact.
The final three parameters in the models are water depth change at the location of
the nest and nest height change between visits to the nest, and the interactions between
them. The water depth was measured at the base of the nest, and the nest height was
measured from the base of the nest to the lip of the top. The interactions term in the
models is simply the multiplication of the two for each nest. The reason for including the
interactions term is that the nest height change depends largely on the depth of the water.
Rails have the ability to increase the height of their nests using nearby nesting material,
and is typically done to help eggs survive flooding conditions (Pospichal and Marshall
1954). While flooding can cause nest failures, it also makes it less likely that a predator
can reach the nests and cause failure through predation (Conway 1995). A strong
6

correlation with daily nest survival probabilities would suggest that more variability in
water levels and nest heights would increase the chances that a rail would survive day to
day.

7

CHAPTER TWO:
BAYESIAN METHODS

2.1 Introduction
Scientific papers rely heavily on statistical inferences to validate findings from
research. The frequentist method of statistics, the most commonly used approach, is one
of many different ways to use data to interpret relationships in science and otherwise. It is
known as the “frequentist” method because the philosophy behind it relies on the
expected frequency that collected data would yield the same results given that the data
were gathered in the same fashion and analyzed in the same way (McCarthy 2011).
Although it is the most commonly used, frequentist statistics has more recently come
under criticism for allowing for conflicting conclusions to be formed from the same data
under different circumstances (McCarthy 2011). Similarly, in order to form a conclusion
based on the data, frequentist statistics requires the setting of a controversial “p-value”
which is used as a guideline to determine if our hypothesis is accepted or rejected. While
no form of analysis is perfect, the abandonment of frequentist methods for the use of
Bayesian methods, which take into account perceived prior information, has been on the
rise (McCarthy 2011). These methods contrast in both fundamental philosophies and
logic (McCarthy 2011). The driving philosophy behind Bayesian methods is based on the
“likelihood” of competing hypotheses, where the likelihood function for each individual
hypothesis is defined as the probability of the hypothesis being true given the observed
8

data (McCarthy 2011). Together, the likelihood function and perceived prior information
give way to the fundamental philosophy of Bayesian methods, that we are calculating the
probability of each competing hypothesis being true given that the data observed is true
(McCarthy 2011). Even though the two approaches also tend to realize conclusions that
are not largely different from each other when using uninformative priors (McCarthy
2011), there are several reasons which I present later to use Bayesian methods over
frequentist (Link and Barker 2010).
2.2 Frequentist Methods Summary
Frequentist methods are based on an approach called null-hypothesis significance
testing in performing statistical inference (McCarthy 2011). The central philosophy is that
the researcher will assume a null-hypothesis, which is a base statement about a mean or a
relationship between two means, is true, and calculate the probability of obtaining a
collected data set given that the null-hypothesis is true (McCarthy 2011). First, one is
required to define a null-hypothesis and an alternative hypothesis, which is the opposite
of the null, in the case the null is rejected. Very often these null-hypotheses are designed
to have a low probability of being true in the first place, making their rejection relatively
uninformative (McCarthy 2011). These null-hypotheses, deemed trivial null-hypotheses,
are used due to the difficulty in forming a non-zero null-hypotheses (McCarthy 2011).
For example, a trivial null-hypothesis might be that the difference between the average
number of math majors and psychology majors at the University of Maine each year is
zero. The two variables in the hypothesis that we would concern ourselves with are the
9

average number of math majors and the average number of psychology majors at the
University of Maine. We may believe it to be extremely likely that the two variables are
in fact different, but crafting and testing a null-hypothesis with a more defined estimate is
difficult (McCarthy 2011). Next is the gathering of your data, which has essentially the
same concerns for all methods of statistics; randomization of sampling and adhering to
any assumptions that must be made in your modeling process are critical (McCarthy
2011).
After obtaining the data set so we can test the null-hypothesis, the frequentist
method calls for the calculation of a p-value, which is the probability of observing the
recorded data set or more extreme data with the assumption that the null-hypothesis is
true (McCarthy 2011). This calculation is done by standardizing the data set and using
standard deviations which takes into account random variability in the data (Quinn and
Keough 2002). Standard deviations for sample data are calculated as:

!

( ( x i ! xbar ) 2 )
n!1

i

(1)

where each xi is an individual data point from your data set, xbar is the mean of the
sample set, and n is the size of the sample set (Quinn and Keough 2002). The sample
standard deviation helps set up a probability distribution around the sample mean, which
describes the probability of every possible value for a variable we are estimating (Quinn
and Keough 2002). Let’s say we are studying the number of heads we would observe in 8
coin flips and our null-hypothesis is that we would have a proportion of .25, or 2 heads,
10

with a standard deviation of 0.15, and our alternative hypothesis is that we would find a
higher proportion of heads on average. Suppose we perform the 8 coin flips and find a
proportion of .625 heads. The probability distribution for our hypothesis above is shown
in Figure (1).

Figure 1. Example of a probability distribution. Assuming our null hypothesis, this distribution represents
the probabilities (y values) of seeing certain proportions of heads (x values) on 8 coin flips, assuming that
the true mean for the proportion of heads is 0.25.

Using this sample probability distribution, we can calculate the probability that we would
obtain this sample data given that the true mean of the proportion is .25. Once the p-value
is calculated, you compare it to an arbitrary value, conventionally set to 0.05, to
determine whether or not you reject the null-hypothesis (Quinn and Keough 2002). As
you can see from Figure (1), the p-value for .625 is extremely low, and is calculated to be
approximately .004. Frequentist thinking leads us to say that the probability of obtaining
this data set just by random chance, given that the true mean is actually .25, is this
11

p-value. Since this probability is so small and this data set seems extremely unlikely by
random chance, a frequentist thinker would say that we reject the null-hypothesis and the
true mean is larger than .25.
However, the p-value is not always so straightforward. Critics claim that the strict
choice of 0.05 or any other value to compare with a p-value has no formal basis and
therefore exposes itself to higher rates of error (McCarthy 2011). In this example
comparing a p-value to 0.05 only means that we are only dissatisfied with the nullhypothesis when we gather data that we would only expect to observe with less than 5%
frequency if our null-hypothesis were true (McCarthy 2011). For example, had our pvalue in the above example come out to be 0.06, we still have a very low probability of
obtaining this data sample by chance, but by conventional standards this is not seen as
statistically significant. If our p-value is larger than the chosen comparative value, we can
only fail to reject the null hypothesis – it is not proven. If the null hypothesis is rejected
due to a small enough p-value, we are forced to accept the alternative hypothesis (Quinn
and Keough 2002). This is another point of criticism, as alternative hypotheses that are
not carefully considered may be even less representative of the data than the null
hypothesis that was just rejected since they are accepted without necessarily confirming it
matches the data (McCarthy 2011).

2.3 Bayesian Methods Summary
Bayesian methods differ vastly in almost all of these major areas. Fundamentally,
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instead of being concerned with the probability of obtaining a data set given a specific
hypothesis, Bayesian thinkers will construct their hypotheses and calculate the
probabilities of each hypothesis given that the data collected are a good representation of
the real data, known as the population. Involved in this process is the use of prior
probability distributions, which is the researcher’s prior beliefs about the data (Dennis
1996). Instead of constructing null and alternative hypotheses, in Bayesian analysis you
can form multiple hypotheses and compare them (McCarthy 2011). These hypotheses can
be represented as hierarchical models in complex cases where we are studying the effects
of certain variables on another (such as later in this paper). These models assign
parameter values to the data, and the idea is to find the model that most accurately
predicts one variable in terms of these parameters. The model hypotheses are most often
chosen based on reality and what the researcher believes are the most realistic hypotheses
(McCarthy 2011). While there are forms of frequentist methods which set up multiple
models to represent hypotheses as well, the underlying thought process that Bayesians are
looking for the probability of each hypothesis being true given the data is the major
difference between the methods.
Once the set of hypotheses to be tested has been chosen, Bayesian thinkers also
take into account prior beliefs about the parameters or means, which is impossible in
frequentist analysis (McCarthy 2011). This is another major advantage of Bayesian
analysis, as frequently scientists compare their results to that of similar studies done in
the past (McCarthy 2011). To incorporate prior belief into the statistical models, a
13

Bayesian thinker will assign probability distributions to each parameter. Just like the
probability distribution described in the frequentist section, these distributions represent
what the researcher believes the probabilities are for the true value of the parameter. This
can be done with uninformative prior distributions, where the range of any possible value
with equal probability is assigned, or with informative prior distributions taken from what
is believed to be the true value of the parameters (Link and Barker 2010). In the case of
uninformative priors, the models usually have similar results as frequentist methods (Link
and Barker 2010). When all the prior distributions have been chosen, the data are
gathered similar to any other method, and we use the principle of Bayes’ Theorem to
calculate a posterior distribution, or the new probability distributions for each parameter
(McCarthy 2011).
Bayes’ Theorem, derived from the relationship of two related probabilities, is then
applied to the prior distributions and the data. Bayes’ Theorem states that for discrete
hypotheses:

Pr ( B i !A ) =

Pr ( A!B i ) Pr ( B i )
! Pr ( A!B j ) Pr ( B j )
j

where Pr(Bi|A) is the probability of an event Bi occurring given event A, Pr(Bi) is the
probability of event Bi, Pr(A|Bi) is the probability of event A occurring given event Bi,
and all Bj and Bi are mutually exclusive events of a set of possible events B (Link and
Barker 2010). For continuous hypotheses:
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(2)

Pr ( B i !A ) =

Pr ( A!B i ) Pr ( B i )
!
! Pr ( A!x ) Pr ( x ) dx
0

(3)

where the integral in the denominator represents all possible events in the set B
(McCarthy 2011). For the continuous case, these are probability densities, meaning that
instead of direct probabilities, they are probability distributions. The coin flipping
example from the frequentist section is an example of a continuous hypothesis, because
there are an infinite amount of numbers between 0 and 1 that could be the true
proportion. An example of a discrete hypothesis might be detecting if a species is present
or absent in a habitat; there is a finite number of outcomes that the species is either
present or absent. In both cases the denominator on the right hand side of the equation is
the probability distribution of A, which is calculated differently depending on the type of
hypothesis you are testing (McCarthy 2011). This probability distribution of A is
essentially only a scaling factor known as the normalizing constant; that is, the posterior
distribution we are looking for is determined by the relationship in the numerator
(McCarthy 2011). This theorem is mathematically and logically sound, and it is only the
application of it that involves any controversy in Bayesian methods (Dennis 1996). Here,
the philosophy is that Pr(Bi) is the probability distribution that the researcher has assigned
as their informative or uninformative prior, which can be subjective and leads to the
controversy (Cox 2006).
Due to the difficulty of calculating the denominator directly in most cases,
hypothesis testing in Bayesian analysis is usually done with Markov Chain Monte Carlo
15

(MCMC) sampling methods (McCarthy 2011). This is a sophisticated sampling algorithm
which will produce a sequence of values where each is derived from the value before it
(McCarthy 2011). The goal of the algorithm is to generate values that look ‘random,’ and
after a substantial number of samples have been taken the values generally do (McCarthy
2011). These samples can be calculated very easily with statistical software. If you wish
to read about the details of how the algorithm works, I recommend the “MCMC
algorithms” appendix of McCarthy’s book, “Bayesian Methods for Ecology,” or chapter
4, “Calculating Posterior Distributions,” of Link and Barker’s book, “Bayesian Inference
with Ecological Applications.”
The most prominent issue with this method of chaining samples is correlation.
Our drawn samples clearly always depend on the previous sample, which can cause
problems in the posterior distribution. It is not useful to have these samples that are
heavily dependent and linked between samples, because they can be low precision and be
inaccurate in estimating the target distribution (Link and Barker 2010). After enough
samples as we approach what will be the posterior distribution, we want the correlation to
become close to zero, meaning that each subsequent random number appears randomly
generated (Link and Barker 2010). To check this, we view an auto-correlation function
plot. This plot calculates a standardized correlational value which is expected to approach
zero as the chain approaches the posterior distribution. Typically when running these
MCMC tests, three chains will be run simultaneously, to compare the correlational
values. It is important that all three chains end up looking relatively the same. An
16

example of a good auto-correlation function plot is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. An example of an auto-correlation function plot: You can see all three chains approach zero very
rapidly, and continue to vary around 0 randomly. These are good auto-correlation function plots, as there
seems to be little correlation between posterior distributions and the first sample distribution.

After ensuring that chains are independent of initial sample distributions, and
having run MCMC tests for each of the model hypothesis, it is time to compare the
models. This is done simply by using DIC, or deviance information criterion. DIC
calculations are the Bayesian alternative to Akaike’s information criterion (or AIC),
proposed by Spiegelhalter et al. (McCarthy 2011). AIC and DIC values are very similar
and when posterior distributions are mostly symmetrical are essentially interchangeable
(McCarthy 2011). DIC is calculated by first determining the deviance at the mean of the
posterior distributions and can be calculated using statistical software. This calculation
provides a gauge at judging what models are the best fit by which ones have the smallest
deviance (Link and Barker 2010). However, it is also important to have simplistic
models, and the best models are considered the ones with the fewest number of
17

parameters that provide the most information (McCarthy 2011). This is where DIC
comes in, which adds a penalty to models for complexity, where complexity means more
parameters. As with deviance, we are looking at models with the lowest DIC values as
the best fits (McCarthy 2011). Typically, without this penalty, models with the most
parameters would be expected to have the lowest deviance, but it is important to question
whether the extra parameters are justified (McCarthy 2011). By adding in the penalty for
complexity, a model with lots of parameters must fit particularly well to have a lower
DIC value than a competing less complex model.
It is not only of concern which is the best model, but how the models differ
amongst themselves. To compare, we look at the ΔDIC, which is the difference between
the DIC of a particular model and the minimum DIC of all the candidate models. Table 1
is a table which compares ΔAIC values and how they should be viewed compared to the
model with the lowest AIC value; since in most cases DIC values are interchangeable
with AIC values, the same comparison rules can apply (McCarthy 2011).

Table 1. Interpretation of the level of support for apparently inferior models relative to the model with the
lowest AIC, based on differences in their AIC values (Burnham and Anderson, 2002).

ΔAIC

Degree of support

0-2

Substantial

4-7

Considerably less

>10

Essentially none
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Once DIC values are calculated, weights can be calculated and assigned to each
model to determine parameter estimates. These weights are normalized values that sum to
one and can be interpreted as the probability that particular model is the best of the
models that were tested (Johnson and Omland 2004). This is done by calculating the
exponential likelihood function and then dividing by the sum of the likelihoods of all the
models (Johnson and Omland 2004):

wi =

e

# ! 1 $ ( !DIC )
! "
i
2

!e

# ! 1 $ ( !DIC )
! "
j
2

j

(4)

Not only are these weights useful when discussing the comparative relevancy
amongst models, but they are used to determine the model averaged parameters.
Researchers are not only interested in whether or not there are effects in science, but also
desire to explain these effects if they are found to be significant. For each parameter
inside of each model, we can use the posterior distributions that have already been
calculated to do so. Although these distributions vary from model to model, cross
averaging them with weights is a direct approach to looking at the overall effects of a
single parameter (Link and Barker 2010). Using the weights calculated from the DIC
values connects the relevancy of the model and the effect of the parameter to give us a
greater understanding. The means for the model average parameters are calculated by
(Johnson and Omland 2004):

19

! map = ! w i ! i
i

(5)

where θmap is the model averaged parameter, and the summation over i is over all the
models that contain the parameter θ. Similarly, the standard errors for these model
averaged parameters are (Johnson and Omland 2004):
SE ( ! map ) =

2
! w i ( ( var ( ! i !g i ) + ( ! i ! ! map ) ) )
i

(6)

where var(θi⎮gi) is the reported standard error of the distribution of θi from model i,
squared. By using equations (5) and (6), distributions for the model average parameters
are calculated.
To summarize the process of Bayesian thinking in an example, let’s take a look at
the coin flipping example from the frequentist section. Suppose we did some research and
discovered that the accepted proportion of getting a heads when flipping a coin is 0.5
with a standard deviation also 0.5. We now want to test what the probability is that the
true proportion of heads is 0.25 given the data we collected. Using the MCMC method
described above, we get a posterior distribution with a mean of 0.5018 and a standard
deviation of 0.1752. Using these numbers, we calculate an estimated probability of 0.077.
This is our new probability of the hypothesis that the true proportion of heads is 0.25. We
can compare this to other hypotheses; for example, if we wanted to know the probability
of a hypothesis that the true proportion of heads is 0.5, or 4 heads in 8 coin flips on
average, we examine the posterior distribution again and have an estimated probability of
0.4959. A Bayesian thinker will compare the probabilities of each hypothesis and make
20

conclusions based on those results.

2.4 Differences in Methods
The differences between Bayesian and frequentist methods are very clear, and
there are advantages and disadvantages to using either. One of the most important
advantages to using Bayesian analysis is the ability to combine previous data with each
study, making it a much more cohesive process to further research a subject (Dennis
1996). Even without any preemptive knowledge, a Bayesian analysis with uninformative
priors will have results similar to what a frequentist’s model would (McCarthy 2011).
Another major advantage to using Bayesian methods is that the philosophy is more
consistent with a natural train of thought. When constructing tests and models in order to
understand data, rarely are researchers concerned with “the probability of finding this
data given that the hypothesis is true” (McCarthy 2011). Realistically, the goal of running
the tests is to learn something, which means the true purpose of all the research is to
unveil information on the hypothesis. This is exactly what the Bayesian method does, in
contrast to frequentist; finding the probability that the hypothesis is true given the
observed data (McCarthy 2011). Since this is what researchers truly seek, it follows
logically that these methods are more well designed for their purpose (McCarthy 2011).
Coming up with multiple hypotheses, represented as models, is also very convenient
using this methodology (Dennis 1996). Instead of being concerned with accepted or
rejected hypotheses based on an arbitrary probability level, models are compared to each
21

other as well as averaged to learn more about which one has the best fit, as well as
finding good parameter estimates across all models.
If it were that simple, Bayesian analysis would likely be much more widely
accepted as the consensus way of analyzing data. There are also controversial drawbacks
to these methods, which come almost entirely in the form of the informative priors
(Dennis 1996). Just as setting arbitrary probability levels and rejecting null-hypotheses in
frequentist statistics can be controversial, informative priors are set up by the researcher’s
own beliefs, which are not always concrete. Those who oppose Bayesian statistics claim
that a disagreement in priors can quite often cause issues in the interpretation of the
results (Cox 2006).
No method of statistical inference is perfect and each has its own drawbacks.
Bayesian analysis, especially when proper attention is given to the informative priors, can
be both useful and convenient in examining relationships in the world. Its use is growing
and it can be strongly considered as a viable way of hypothesis testing.
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CHAPTER THREE:
COMPARISONS OF MODELS

3.1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to compare and contrast the use of Bayesian and
frequentist methods in the statistical analysis in ecological research. Ellen Robertson
wrote a thesis in partial fulfillment of a Degree of Master of Science in Ecology and
Environmental Science in May 2012, which discussed the daily nest survival probabilities
of two birds in the family Rallidae; the Virginia Rail (Rallus limicola) and the Sora
(Porzana carolina), which she groups together to call “rails.” In her research, Robertson
used information theoretic methods, which is a form of model hypothesis testing that uses
frequentist philosophies, to determine ecological models to explain the probabilities. I
examined her data, research and conclusions and used them to perform a Bayesian
analysis.
Robertson studied ten wetlands in Maine, five of which were impounded. There,
she and other researchers searched for nests of both birds and recorded the date, water
depth at the nest, and the nest height (which she defines as the height from the base of the
nest to the lip of the nest). The observer would return to the nest once every 3-5 days until
the nest was determined successful or failed. Success was defined as at least one hatched
egg, where a failure lost all eggs either through predation or nest damage such as
flooding. When the age of the nest was not known exactly, it was approximated by using
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the number of eggs in the nest and the hatching date for successful nests, and was
assumed to be found in the middle of incubation for failed nests.
In Robertson’s 16 candidate models, factors that were considered were age of the
nest, nest height change, water depth change, whether or not the investigated wetland was
impounded or not, and the interaction of nest height change and water depth change.

3.2 Methods
To work on Robertson’s models of rail nest daily survival probabilities and
reanalyze them using Bayesian methods, I needed to obtain her observational data as well
as statistical software which had the capability of running MCMC chains and running
Bayesian analysis, and used the statistical software “R” (R Core Development Team
2011). For the Bayesian methods, I wrote models defined in .txt files, which are then
loaded into the R workspace to be used in the analysis. These models are defined with
prior distributions, and a mathematical definition of the model we are testing. I put all the
data together and with all models except for Model 12 ran a burn-in of 1000 samples to
be discarded to avoid problems with correlation, following up with a chain of 25,000
samples to be recorded. I then ran a reverse burn-in to observe a final 2,500 samples. The
main reason Model 12 required a much larger burn-in, 25,000, was the correlation
between MCMC generated samples was too high, and after running the larger burn-in the
auto-correlation function produced values much closer to 0. These samples are used to
determine a posterior distribution for each parameter which R fed back to me.
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Using Robertson’s observational data, I first recreated all of her models using
uninformative priors. My uninformative priors were a normal distribution with mean 0
and a standard deviation of 1000, which results in an effective distribution from -3000 to
3000 that covers all plausible values for the parameters. I examined each of Robertson’s
16 candidate models with a Bayesian perspective. Once the chaining process was
completed, I produced auto-correlation function plots, density plots, and trace plots for
each parameter, and recorded the means and standard errors associated with each
parameter for each model. After this was done for each candidate model, I calculated the
DIC values and weights as to compare the fit of the models to Robertson’s. Using the
weights, I also calculated parameter estimates for each of the variables as well as the
standard errors.
Next I searched for informative priors for logistic models on daily nest survival.
This process ended up being more difficult as the research done in Robertson’s thesis was
relatively original. So for prior distributions, I used her results for parameter estimations
as informative prior distributions, only multiplying the standard errors by 3. Other than
the prior distributions, the calculations and sampling methods were reproduced exactly as
they were for the models with uninformative priors.

3.3 Results
Overall, the Bayesian analysis proved to be relatively similar to the frequentist
analysis done by Robertson. For the model averaged estimates, none of the parameters,
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either from frequentist, Bayesian with informative priors, or Bayesian with
uninformative priors were significantly different from each other, although there were a
few differences. The standard error for the interactions between water depth change and
nest height change, as well as water depth change itself, were larger in both Bayesian
analysis tests than the frequentist, suggesting that we are less confident in our estimations
of the effect of the variables. Also, Robertson found a significant effect of age while both
of my Bayesian analyses included 0 within one standard error of the mean. This suggests
that there is a weaker effect of age than was found in the frequentist analysis, notably
even more so with the informative prior analysis.

Figure 3. Model-averaged mean plus or minus one standard error for the parameter of intercept in
Robertson’s models compared to the Bayesian analysis with uninformative and informative priors.
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Figure 4. Model-averaged mean plus or minus one standard error for the parameter of age in Robertson’s
models compared to the Bayesian analysis with uninformative and informative priors.

Figure 5. Model-averaged mean plus or minus one standard error for the parameter of water depth change
in Robertson’s models compared to the Bayesian analysis with uninformative and informative priors.
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Figure 6. Model-averaged mean plus or minus one standard error for the parameter of nest height change in
Robertson’s models compared to the Bayesian analysis with uninformative and informative priors.

Figure 7. Model-averaged mean plus or minus one standard error for the parameter of impoundment in
Robertson’s models compared to the Bayesian analysis with uninformative and informative priors.
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Figure 8. Model-averaged mean plus or minus one standard error for the parameter of the interaction
between water depth change and nest height change in Robertson’s models compared to the Bayesian
analysis with uninformative and informative priors.
Table 2. Model-averaged parameter estimates for Robertson’s models and both the Bayesian models with
uninformative and informative priors.

Parameter

Robertson’s
Estimate ±
Standard Error

Bayesian
Uninformative
Prior Estimate ±
Standard Error

Bayesian
Informative Prior
Estimate ±
Standard Error

Intercept

2.53 ± 0.61

1.95 ± 0.64

2.16 ± 0.46

Age

0.06 ± 0.03

0.05 ± 0.05

0.03 ± 0.04

Water Depth
Change

0.15 ± 0.05

0.16 ± 0.12

0.16 ± 0.11

Nest Height
Change

-0.04 ± 0.13

0.01 ± 0.14

0.01 ± 0.14

Impoundment

0.30 ± 0.44

0.38 ± 0.71

0.27 ± 0.51

Water Depth
Change * Nest
Height Change

0.06 ± 0.03

0.08 ± 0.07

0.08 ± 0.06
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Similarly, there was very little variation between the three methods of analysis when it
came to the comparisons of the models. In all three methods, Robertson’s top model,
which combined water depth change, nest height change, age, and the interaction
between water depth change and nest height change, was calculated to be the best model
with the highest weight. Likewise, Robertson’s worst model, which combined
impoundment and nest height change, was calculated to be the worst model with the
lowest weight also for the Bayesian models. The largest difference in the analysis was the
overall differences in the AIC/DIC values. In Robertson’s analysis, the top model had a
weight of 0.4, which suggested that of the models she tested there was a 40% chance that
model was the best, while the weights for the Bayesian analysis were .23 for
uninformative priors and .22 for informative priors, suggesting only a 23% and 22%
chance respectfully that model was the best. The DIC values were much closer together
for both of the Bayesian analyses than for the AIC values for Robertson’s, as the ΔAIC
for her worst model was 10.0, but the ΔDIC for the worst Bayesian models were 6.47 for
models with uninformative priors and 6.1 for models with informative priors. This leads
to the weights also being much closer together overall, as the variance (a measure of how
far the data is spread out) of the weights for Robertson’s models was 0.01, but for both
Bayesian models was 0.005. The rankings were very similar in all three cases, with R2
correlational values (with ±1 being heavily correlated and 0 being not correlated at all)
being 0.79 and .71 between Robertson’s models and the Bayesian models with
uninformative priors and informative priors respectfully.
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Table 3. The models in order of Robertson’s rankings and their parameters. These were used an all three
analysis.

Model #

Parameters

1

water depth change + nest height change + age + water depth change *
nest height change

2

impoundment + water depth change + nest height change + age + water
depth change * nest height change

3

water depth change + nest height change + water depth change * nest
height change

4

age + water depth change

5

age

6

impoundment + water depth change + nest height change + water depth
change * nest height change

7

impoundment + age + water depth change

8

impoundment + age

9

age + nest height change

10

null (constant intercept)

11

water depth change

12

impoundment + age + nest height change

13

impoundment + water depth change

14

impoundment

15

nest height change

16

impoundment + nest height change
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Table 4. Comparisons between models for Robertson’s analysis and the Bayesian analysis. Robertson used
AIC values in place of DIC values, which are virtually the same in this case. The smaller the AIC/DIC
value and the higher the weight, wi, the higher the probability the model is the best among those listed.
(ER) means the column stands for Robertson’s analysis, (UN) means the column stands for the Bayesian
analysis with uninformative priors and (IN) means the column stands for the Bayesian analysis with
informative priors.
Model
#

AIC
(ER)

ΔAIC
(ER)

wi
(ER)

DIC
(UN)

ΔDIC
(UN)

wi
(UN)

DIC
(IN)

ΔDIC
(IN)

wi
(IN)

New
Rank
(UN)

New
Rank
(IN)

1

160

0

0.40

160

0

0.23

160

0

0.22

1

1

2

162

1.6

0.18

162

1.6

0.10

161

0.7

0.15

3

3

3

163

2.9

0.09

161

0.7

0.20

160

0.3

0.19

2

2

4

164

3.5

0.07

164

3.5

0.04

164

3.5

0.04

6

6

5

164

3.6

0.07

162

1.7

0.10

163

3.0

0.05

5

5

6

165

4.7

0.04

162

1.7

0.10

161

1.1

0.13

4

4

7

165

5.0

0.03

165

4.3

0.03

164

4.3

0.03

10

11

8

166

5.2

0.03

164

4.1

0.03

164

4.2

0.03

9

10

9

166

5.5

0.03

166

5.4

0.02

165

5.1

0.02

13

13

10

167

6.4

0.02

164

3.5

0.04

164

3.6

0.04

7

7

11

167

6.4

0.02

164

3.9

0.03

164

4.0

0.03

8

8

12

168

7.1

0.01

167

6.2

0.01

166

5.9

0.01

15

15

13

169

8.1

0.01

165

4.5

0.02

164

4.3

0.03

12

12

14

169

8.1

0.01

165

4.3

0.03

164

4.1

0.03

11

9

15

169

8.3

0.01

166

5.5

0.01

166

5.6

0.01

14

14

16

170

10.0

0

167

6.5

0.01

166

6.1

0

16

16
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3.4 Discussion/Conclusions
We expected both of the Bayesian methods, especially the one with uninformative
priors, to have results that were very similar to Robertson’s, and they did. All the model
averaged parameter estimates were within one standard error of each other, implying that
the estimations were all similar. Likewise the top 6 overall models were the same for all
three methods, and the rankings between them being so heavily correlated shows that the
overall results are the essentially the same. Considering that the best model and the worst
model according to AIC/DIC calculations were the same in all three also suggests that the
methods come to the same conclusions.
One major difference between the methods was the spread of the AIC/DIC values,
resulting in a difference in the spread of the weights as well. It was much more likely that
Robertson’s best model was the best of those she tested than was the case for either of the
Bayesian models. The Bayesian analysis then implies that the models are much more
similar to each other than what Robertson’s analysis found. From models numbered 10
and higher, her analysis showed almost no support. In the Bayesian analysis, there was
not much overall support but considerably higher support that in Robertson’s tests seem
to have been allocated to the top model. This makes it much less likely that we throw out
any of the models from consideration. From the Bayesian tests we see that there appear to
be three tiers of interchangeable acceptance; models 1 and 3 appear to be the best, models
2,4,5 and 6 appear to be close, and the rest can all be grouped together. While this is a
major difference between the tests, the overall results are extremely similar. We still
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accept model 1 as the best model with the highest probability of being the correct model
and there were no models that surprised, with the highest change in ranking being model
number 7 being ranked 10th and 11th in the uninformative and the informative analysis
respectfully.
The inclusion of 0 in the within one standard error of the mean for the age
parameter is also an important difference in the models as Robertson’s frequentist
analysis shows it to have a significant effect on daily nest survival probability but the
Bayesian analysis, while not ruling it out, suggests that the evidence of an effect from the
age variable is not as strong. More importantly, the Bayesian analysis that used
informative priors had a mean even closer to zero. Since we expect the Bayesian analysis
with uninformative priors to be similar to frequentist analysis, and the use of informative
priors is of high importance to Bayesian methods, this is an important difference.
However, in the top rated model, the means and standard errors for the uninformative and
informative Bayesian analyses were .047 ± .033 and .034 ± .026 respectively, both
intervals excluding zero. This might mean that including models with less support in the
model averaging, despite having a lower model weights, could have resulted in larger
standard errors.
For the parameters for water depth change, and the interaction between water
depth change and nest height change, the standard errors were significantly larger. Unlike
the parameter of age, in all three analyses the effect of both variables seems to be
significant, but the difference in the standard errors suggests that we know less about how
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important the impact they have on daily survival probabilities is.
A small disagreement in the sign of the nest height change parameter, Robertson’s
being negative and the Bayesian analysis showing it to be slightly positive, can be
attributed to the standard error. For all three methods, the standard error was an order of
magnitude higher than the estimate for the nest height change parameter, meaning that we
are unsure if the true value is positive or negative, despite what the estimates are. While a
sign change may seem like a significant difference, after observing the standard errors we
see that in reality it is not.
The Bayesian models with the lowest DIC values contained the parameters for the
interaction between water depth change and nest height change as well as water depth
change. In fact, none of the models without both of these parameters ranked higher than
the four models that contained them for either Bayesian analysis. However, there are also
models with water depth change that do not contain the interaction term that do not rank
as highly, which implies that it is the addition of both of these variables that is important
in estimating the daily nest survival probabilities.
We can conclude then that parameter estimations, model rankings, and overall
conclusions were nearly identical. For possible further research into the topic, it would
have been better to find informative priors from a study separate from the one where the
observed data came from. More development on the research of predicting daily nest
survival probabilities of rails is necessary to delve better into the informative prior
perspective.
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